MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

Vol. 1, No. 66   Session 1

Meeting of the Parliament

Wednesday 5 April 2000

3. Holyrood Project: Sir David Steel, on behalf of the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body, moved S1M-720—That the Parliament notes—

"and, in order to be fully informed when making a final decision on the location, design, specification and cost of its permanent home, (a) directs the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body to present to it in early June the scheme design for the Holyrood buildings prepared by the design team, along with the most detailed possible plans, with evaluation and costs, prepared by independent experts for (i) the St Andrew’s House/Royal High School site with new build parliament chamber and (ii) the Mound site based on the acquisition of the New College Campus and development of nearby buildings; (b) calls upon the Scottish Executive to co-operate fully with the study of these options and to publish a report on financing options for the parliament buildings; (c) approves the SPCB’s proposal for a progressing group to take on day to day responsibility for the project of creating the Parliament’s new home and (d) agrees to make a final decision on the permanent Parliament buildings in June in the light of the information requested."

"the report of the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body on the Holyrood Project; approves its terms, and directs the Corporate Body to establish a progress group comprising representatives of the Parliament and relevant professionals to work with the Corporate Body to (a) finalise the design; (b) complete the project by the end of 2002 within a total budget of £195 million, and (c) report regularly, or as from time to time may be required, on progress including on expenditure to date and estimated completion costs to the SCPB and to members."

SP Paper 99

HOLYROOD PROJECT

The Scottish Parliament Corporate Body reports to the Parliament as follows:

Introduction

1. This report is intended to help our colleagues in the Parliament reach a view on the future of the Holyrood Project. The Corporate Body was handed full responsibility for the Project on 1 June. But, given the importance of the project to the people of Scotland as well as MSPs and the many people who use a Parliament building, it is only right that the Parliament as a whole takes this crucial decision.


Summary

2. The following summarises our views and in doing so responds to the key points in John Spencely’s report (which is attached at Annexe 1). We take this opportunity to thank him and his team for their hard work over the past 3 weeks.


3. Our principal conclusion is that, should the Parliament decide to proceed with the Holyrood Project, it can be completed to latest design (plans are attached at Annexe 2 – there will be a full presentation to Members early next week); and delivered within a total budget of £195m. The design and construction teams have advised that the building can be completed, fitted and commissioned by the end of 2002.


4. Our report is aimed at addressing the concerns identified in the Spencely Report and, perhaps more importantly, advising colleagues on how we might best proceed from here with the Holyrood Project.


5. In particular we accept the challenge laid down in Section 9 in John Spencely’s report. Specifically,

• the brief for the project should now be finalised. We have attempted since June to respond to the understandable demands from Members, staff and others for appropriate facilities in the new building. We have also had strong representation from Historic Scotland and others on Queensberry House. This has resulted in significant redesign, in particular, in the debating chamber. To meet the cost and programme described above, this process must now be concluded.
  
  
• the budget available is a matter for the Parliament. If it accepts the estimate of £195m then the approved scheme design – which is very close to completion (and on which Members will be briefed before the debate) – will be delivered on the basis of that budget.
  
  
• we have considered very carefully John Spencely’s view that the project cannot be completed by the completion date most recently reported to us ie the end of 2002. This depends entirely on when our construction management team are given the go-ahead to proceed on the basis of an approved scheme and budget. We would aim to do so as quickly as possible after any vote to proceed with Holyrood. And on that basis the clear target would be the end of 2002.
  
  
• the management and direction of and communication within the Project can be improved. In particular, we recommend acceptance of John Spencely’s proposal to establish a project progressing committee to provide the time and expertise needed to complete the Holyrood project.
  
  
• we have already received assurances as to the working arrangements between architects, engineers and surveyors and to the arrangements for handling future, detailed design work.

6. Finally, we advise colleagues that our best estimate, drawing on John Spencely’s advice, is that the cost of cancelling Holyrood would be a minimum of £25m, based on costs incurred of £30m and a net site value of £2-6m. There is however in our view a significant likelihood that this could be higher taking into account, in particular, the risk of legal action to settle claims.

7. It might be helpful to consider the original brief for the project.

"The building the Scottish Parliament occupies must be of such a quality, durability and civic importance as to reflect the Parliament’s status and operational needs; it must be secure but also accessible to all including people with special needs; it must promote modern and efficient ways of working and good environmental practice.

It will be an important symbol for Scotland. It should pay tribute to the country’s past achievement and signal its future aspirations. It must be flexible enough to accommodate changes over time in operational requirements. Quality and value for money are also key considerations. The accommodation must allow Scottish Parliamentarians and their staff to work efficiently harnessing the best of
modern technology

People must be able to see and meet their elected representatives and watch the Parliament in operation. Provision needs to be made to permit easy reporting and broadcasting of parliamentary proceedings so that people throughout Scotland can be aware of its work and decisions. Historic surroundings should be respected and the design should be integrated with surrounding landscape and urban
context…"

8. What is clear from this is the true client is the people of Scotland. We must, above all, aim to meet their aspirations for this hugely symbolic
project.

Looking back: June 1999 – February 2000

9. As we approach this pivotal moment on the future of our Parliament building, it is helpful to look back at how we have arrived at this point taking into account advice from the project design team and the key points in the Spencely report. On this basis, we will look ahead at how the project should be handled should the Parliament decide to proceed. When we first reported to Members on 9 June 1999, eight days after taking responsibility for the project, the motion to establish Committees had not yet been debated; the Official Report had only reported 7 meetings of the Parliament and Introduction of the first Bill was still almost 3 months away. Our responsibility was to translate the Parliament’s needs into reality. However, in June it was not possible to have a full appreciation of those needs.

10. The Parliament had approved a total budget for the project of £109m. This included £62m plus £6m contingency for construction. It also included a modest allowance for fit-out as well as fees and VAT. We were aware that this budget did not include any risk allowances though we had not established at the time exactly what they amounted to. These are almost £16m which, together with "enhancement" (an allowance for higher quality fixtures which might have been required), gives a potential total construction cost of £89m.

11. It may well have been possible for the project as it then stood to have been completed for a figure in the region of £109m. At the time we accepted the £62m construction component of this as a challenging budget. But clearly it assumed very limited design changes and no delays.

12. Clearly there have been design changes and delays. Indeed we embarked almost immediately after the debate – during which considerable concern was expressed on the subject – on redesigning the Chamber. It was clear to us that significant numbers of colleagues were unhappy with the existing proposal. Given the critical importance of the chamber to the Parliament we felt there was no option but to order a redesign. The revised design reflects the express and practical needs of the Parliament. The other principal issues which had to be addressed - and which rendered the budget inadequate were redesigning the building to meet the emerging needs of the Parliament and the unforeseen problems of Queensberry House. These are all discussed in more detail below:


The emerging needs of the Parliament

12.1 It became apparent during the autumn that some elements of our staffing provision were inadequate to meet the needs of MSPs, staff, members of the public and the media. In particular, the workload of Committees; the need to assist in the drafting of Members’ Bills; research demands; IT support and the extent of the legislative programme were among the pressures which led the Corporate Body to authorise additional recruitment. At the same time Members and the political parties were assessing the weight of their own duties and recruiting staff accordingly. And the level of public interaction and media activity (whilst, of course, welcome) was higher than anticipated. The design team were consequently asked to consider how best to accommodate the increased numbers. The total area has increased from 23,000 to over 30,000 square metres. Despite this, the costs per square metre of the building have however remained relatively static.


Queensberry House

12.2 Our initial information about the condition of Queensberry House was contained in a report commissioned from Simpson and Brown (1) For the Secretary of State for Scotland, December 1997 which concluded that the House was in a fundamentally sound condition. However, furthermore detailed investigations by the design team revealed that the structural condition was actually not sound. The essential remedial works doubled to £9.4m and an enhanced contingency of £1.4m was required due to the continuing uncertainty on the building condition. It later became clear that the original use envisaged for the House (and in particular the ground floor) would not be acceptable to Historic Scotland and designs required to be re-worked accordingly.

(1) For the Secretary of State for Scotland, December 1997


Cost control

13. Trying to deal with costs has been a constant and consistent issue for the Corporate Body. In total, 11 cost reports have been compiled on the project – 8 of these were for the Scottish Office when it was responsible for the Project. We have had 3 including a major value engineering exercise in the autumn – which produced savings of £13m. The most recent was set in train in February this year. As a result of that report – which projected a possible building cost of £125m – we took the view that Parliament must be alerted to the facts and commissioned the Spencely Report to assist in that process.

14. It is important to stress that – thanks in no small measure to the skill and dedication of those working on the Project - the project has developed considerably – and positively – since June 1999 to the point that it will meet the practical needs of the Parliament and could move forward to the next phase. Some illustrative material associated with the revised design is at Annexe 2.


The Spencely Report

15. The re-design which had been undertaken took the project outwith the boundaries of the June budget and programme estimate. A 30,000 square metre building cannot be delivered for the same cost as a 23,000 square metre one without seriously compromising on quality and the time dedicated to re-design clearly diverted the Design Team from their planned programme of work. We therefore sought to draw together the detailed work on costings, (including the results of the most recent cost-reduction exercise) and programme in order to enable us to re-evaluate the required budget and time to completion before presenting these to Parliament.

16. Given that the costs and programme were significantly different from those we were handed in June 1999, we recognised that an independent assessment of these estimates would provide additional reassurance to members and for that reason retained John Spencely to provide independent information about cost and timescale. We are indebted to Mr Spencely and his team for their endeavours to get to grips with the complexities of the project and for delivering their report within what was a very constrained timescale.


Looking forward: February 2000 onwards

17. We hope it will be most useful to colleagues to address this primarily by reference to the key points in the Spencely report on cost, programme and management. We accept John Spencely’s essential point that the approved budget must relate to the brief and, perhaps more importantly, to the scheme design. Indeed the intention behind taking stock and consulting the Parliament is to enable these to be reconsidered.


The brief

18. The basic brief is that signed off by the Scottish Office in November 1998. Clearly things have moved on a great deal since then and, as reported earlier, the needs of the Parliament have changed significantly since last summer once the Parliament was up and running. Revisions have been produced to the brief to reflect these new demands though in some instances – the debating chamber in particular – the design team was asked to redesign within the terms of the existing brief.


The scheme design

19. This now fundamentally meets the requirements of the Parliament as described in the original brief and the various amendments produced since 1998. But it has yet formally to be approved, as John Spencely notes. It must be if we are to proceed and complete the project to an agreed cost and timescale. Members will be briefed on the current scheme design before the debate on 5 April. If the Parliament decides to proceed, we will aim to sign off the scheme design as quickly as possible thereafter. The design team have assured us that the remaining detailed working will be completed in time for a scheme design to be submitted by the end of April.


Approved budget

20. The current approved budget is £109m – which implies a construction cost of £62m (plus contingency of £6m). John Spencely is therefore absolutely correct to say it bears no relation to the brief or current scheme design. The cost report we received in February suggested a construction cost of £125m. In section 4 of his report, John Spencely projects a construction cost of £126m. He translates this into a total cost of £230m. Apart from fees, VAT and contingency – all of which we agree must form part of the total budget – he includes inflation. It is not common practice to include a separate inflation allowance in government building procurement as all calculations are made in cash terms to allow direct comparisons. We believe this is the correct approach in relation to the Parliament building.

21. John Spencely goes on to conclude that savings of the order of 15%-20% can be made. This would produce a construction cost of £110-£115m and a total cost of £185 to £196m (assuming VAT on fees is recovered). We had already instigated a parallel exercise, prior to appointing John Spencely, which has separately concluded that a construction cost of £108 is achievable. Depending on the level of contingency, this produces a total cost in the range of £190m to £195m. Included within this total cost is a fit-out budget of £19m. The Spencely Report endorses this figure.

22. Parliament is invited to determine whether it wishes the Holyrood Project to proceed on a revised budget of £195m. Annexe 3 describes how the current approved budget of £109m moved to £195 and gives a breakdown of that estimate. The Parliament must, of course, decide whether it is prepared to proceed on that basis. If it did, brief, design and approved budget would be consistent.


Programme

23. A great deal has already been achieved on the site. All the permanent piling for the car park is completed; 12,000 cubic metres of concrete has been poured to form the car park floor area and the columns supporting the floor area above the car park. And the superstructure for the MSP block is under construction off-site.

24. Mr Spencely’s reservations as to the expected completion date of the project have been carefully considered. We understand that this view was arrived at on the basis of a number of assumptions, one of which was the cessation of all project activity for a period of 3 months. We have received assurances from the construction manager and the design team that the building will be completed by the end of 2002. We accept the reassurances but we take seriously John Spencely’s views. We cannot in reality give an absolute commitment until we have signed off the scheme. Once we do so, we would report again to colleagues with a firm commitment.


Quality and Value for money

25. Both are paramount. But it is especially important to deliver on quality in the areas which will be used by the public, in particular the Chamber and Committee rooms and main foyer. Considerable work has been undertaken by our Quantity Surveyor in considering comparisons with similar buildings and we are satisfied that we areworking within reasonable estimates for the quality and size of building which is envisaged. We note Mr Spencely’s comparison with Portcullis House in this context which is costing more than £1,000 per m² more than the MSP block.

26. Conscious of the need to achieve good value for money and in line with EU procurement rules we have sought to source materials on a global basis but wherever possible would hope to contract the manufacturing work to Scottish companies.

27. Throughout this process we have engaged with the Royal Fine Art Commission for Scotland; the City of Edinburgh Council; Historic Scotland and similar organisations with a proper interest in the quality of the building. The project has been well received by all these bodies and we have satisfied them that the building is a fitting design for its location. Any fundamental compromise on quality would not be acceptable to these parties.

28. We note the Spencely Report’s recommendation in relation to Queensberry House and understand and concur with its conclusions on the expense involved. However, mindful of the historic importance of the House and the role it plays in integrating the design with its historic surroundings and urban landscape, as required by the original brief, we believe that it is right to proceed as planned.

29. It is usual, as the design is being finalised, for this stage in the design process to involve the Design Team and construction manager in a rigorous process of simplification, design refinement and improvement. This is now taking place and our own Quantity Surveyors have confirmed that cost reductions consistent with a final cost of £195m can be achieved without reducing the fundamental quality, in line with Mr Spencely’s observations.

Contractual methods

30. The construction management approach – which John Spencely explains in chapter 7 of his report and commends – has enabled significant progress to be made on site notwithstanding the continued development of the final design. We accept that the established method offers us the flexibility to deliver each element of the building at the best possible time and at the best possible price thereby contributing to the achievement of the overall agreed programme and budget.


Communication and management issues

31. John Spencely notes that all conventional mechanisms for project management are in place. But he criticises some aspects, especially communication and makes suggestions on future management. We accept that these matters should be addressed. Specifically, on management, we accept the case for a group which has the time and expertise available to it in taking forward the project. The SPCB cannot - indeed does not wish – to divest itself of ultimate responsibility for Holyrood. But, we would remit day-to-day responsibility for the project to a progressing group.

32. While we regard working arrangements within the team as a matter for them alone, we understand – in relation to John Spencely’s specific recommendation - that the overwhelming majority of work at the next stage will be undertaken in Edinburgh. On that basis we are satisfied with the manner in which the Design Team (architect, construction manager and Quantity Surveyor) are now functioning.


Fees

33. As Mr Spencely says, the fee agreement with the design team was entered into on the basis of a £50m project. In line with normal practice, negotiations will be entered into with each commissioned consultant if the building costs increase to the levels now estimated.


Cancellation costs

34. We note the Spencely report’s comments on the current market value of the Holyrood site based on the valuations of the Chief Valuer for Scotland. These indicate that the market value might be of the order of £2m -£6m (his "Scenario 2") on the assumption that £11m plus fees etc is spent on Queensberry House. This is in line with our current plans and therefore seems to us most realistic.

35. As Mr Spencely says, it is impossible to quantify the costs of termination with any degree of precision. This is one area in which it is impossible to cap costs and where taking risks can be very costly. We believe therefore that the net cost of cancellation of Holyrood would be upward of £25m. That is the £30m spent or committed to date less, say, £5m site value. If we were budgeting for this cost, it would be significantly more than £25m.


Remaining in the current ‘temporary’ accommodation

36. The accommodation on the Mound was acquired and fitted out specifically to serve the Parliament for 2-3 years. The Parliament’s temporary accommodation at the Mound and George IV Bridge is on short-term leases from the Church of Scotland and the City of Edinburgh Council. It is clear that longer term occupation – even assuming the owners agreed to extend the leases – would involve significant expenditure.

37. There are significant statutory barriers to long-term occupation (e.g. fire, building control, asbestos, disabled access) and remedial works on these would be costly. Experience has shown that office standards are inadequate and the dispersal of staff across several streets (and 7 buildings) is very inefficient.

38. The provision for public participation is particularly poor. We cannot accommodate all those who wish to see Committees in action and there is a similar problem in relation to the media whose attendance is often rationed. Catering facilities are non-existent for visitors and there are very virtually no facilities where Members can hold private conversations with constituents.


Conclusion

39. It is now a matter for the Parliament’s own judgement and the SPCB has set out the means to complete the project with costs.

Report
on
The Holyrood Project
to
The Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body
by
John D Spencely

March 2000

Index

1. Introduction

2. My Terms of Reference

3. The Chronology of the Project

4. Review of the current estimates of cost

5. Review of the current estimate of time to delivery and occupation

6. Review of the value for money of the project

7. Review and comparison of the advantages of alternative contractual methods

8. Review of the effect on cost and delivery of a reduced specification

9. Review of the effectiveness of communications between the Corporate Body and the Project Team with recommendations

10. Report on the current market value of the Holyrood site

11. Report on expenditure to date

1 Introduction

1.1 I was appointed by the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body on 25 February 2000, in accordance with the Terms of Reference 1 - 5 as set out in section 2 below, to report by 27 March 2000. Terms of Reference 6 and 7 were added during the course of the Review and I was also asked to make recommendations under all Terms of Reference and to consider options for future action as I thought fit. This is my Report.

1.2 I appointed, with the Corporate Body’s consent, Neil G Thomson Chartered Quantity Surveyor and Robert B Wilson Chartered Architect and Director of Estates of the University of Glasgow as my Advisers.

1.3 My Review has been carried out over a three week period by me and my two Advisers. We have interviewed each member of the Corporate Body, members of the Project Team and the Design Team and representatives of the Construction Manager, all of whom have been very helpful. We have been given access to reports and minutes of some Project and other meetings and have inspected the work in progress in the Architect’s Edinburgh office and on site.

1.4 I am conscious that, in the very short time available, my appreciation of the detail of the Project can only be a fraction of that held by those who have been involved for the past two years or so. Nevertheless my Advisers and I have independently each come to similar conclusions as to the condition of the Project. These conclusions form the basis of my Report.

1.5 The creation of a building to house the Nation’s Parliament is a great enterprise. Those engaged in bringing this Project to fruition are working in a situation and on a building which are unavoidably more complicated than most, if not all, have ever experienced. Little in their previous experience can have prepared them for this task. We found an enthusiasm and dedication to the project at all levels, tempered somewhat by the stresses and strains of recent events.

1.6 Nevertheless my appointment by the Corporate Body indicated that all might not be well with the Project and my Review confirms this.

1.7 It would have been impossible for me to have fulfilled my Terms of Reference without the help of the Valuation Office Agency on whose professional advice I have relied in respect of the site value and the Construction Manager on whose programming skills I have relied on in assessing a likely completion date.

1.8 I owe special thanks to my Advisers without whose skilled assistance my task would have been impossible and to whom I am accordingly greatly indebted.

1.9 In this Report, the "Client" means the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body; the "Project Team" means the Client’s Project Sponsor, Project Managers and their team; the "Design Team" means the Architect, the Engineers, the Quantity Surveyor and other design consultants; the "Construction Manager" means Bovis.

1.10 My Report is provided to the Corporate Body to assist with its review of the Holyrood Project. The estimates for the building and fit-out costs have been provided by, or derived from information provided by, the Quantity Surveyor and the Project Team. The expenditure figures have been provided by the Project Team. I have not independently measured the area of the building. I have not made any independent estimates of, nor made market enquiries about, building or fit-out costs. I have not made any independent check of the expenditure figures.

1.11 My views on the scope for potential changes to the costs of the building and fit-out are based on my understanding of the current proposals of the Design Team and the Project Team.

1.12 The actual potential for real and achievable changes is a matter for the Project Team and the Design Team based on their knowledge of the Project. Any confirmation of the budget or establishment of a new budget for the Project is a matter for the Client based on advice from the Project Team and the Design Team. Any approvals by the Client of design or design changes and any approval of expenditure estimates should be based on advice given to the Client by the Project Team and the Design Team.

John D Spencely
MA BArch DipTP RIBA PPRIAS MRTPI FCIArb
24 March 2000

2 My Terms of Reference

My terms of reference are as follows:

1 To review the current estimates of cost and time to delivery and occupation

2 To review the value for money of the Project

3 To review and compare the advantages of alternative contractual methods

4 To review the effect on cost and delivery of a reduced specification

5 To review the effectiveness of communications between the Corporate Body and the Project Team

6 To report on the current market value of the Holyrood site

7 To report on expenditure to date


and to make recommendations and consider options for future action as I think fit.

3 The Chronology of the Project

3.1 The Holyrood site was selected in January 1998.

3.2 The Brief was produced in April 1998.

3.3 The Architect was appointed in July 1998.

3.4 The Architect’s Outline Proposals were presented to the Client in October 1998.

3.5 The Brief was revised by the Client during the Outline Proposals work stage.

3.6 The Architect’s Scheme Design, which accommodated the changes to the Client’s Brief, was presented to the Client in March
1999.

3.7 Responsibility as Client for the project passed from the Secretary of State of Scotland to the Scottish Parliament on 1 June 1999.

3.8 On 17 June 1999, the Scottish Parliament agreed the following motion:

That the Parliament endorses the decision to provide its permanent home on the Holyrood site and authorises the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body to take forward the project in accordance with the plans developed by the EBMT/RMJM design team and within the timescale and costs estimates described in the Presiding Officer’s note to members of 9 June 1999.

4 Review of the current estimates of cost

4.1 This section reviews the history of cost reporting for the Project and provides, at paragraph 4.5 below, an estimate of the cost of the Project as I believe it actually stood in February 2000.

Costs have been reported throughout this Project under two main headings:

• basic construction cost
• fit-out and other costs
  
  

The fit-out cost and other costs includes professional fees, VAT, site acquisition costs, demolition and furniture, fittings and other
equipment not included in the basic construction cost.


4.2 The basic construction cost

4.2.1 10 separate cost reports, from the original site comparison cost completed in December 1997 to the last feasibility cost check
on the plans current as at February 2000, have been produced by the Quantity Surveyor. A value engineering exercise carried out in
the summer and autumn of 1999 by the Design Team culminated in a report submitted to the Project Sponsor in October 1999.

4.2.2 These cost reports have been examined and the level of drawing and specification information available at each stage for
costing has been established in discussion with the Quantity Surveyor.

4.2.3 The following table has been produced in order to plot the movement of the basic building cost over the last two years. A
commentary follows.

4.3 Commentary on cost reports

4.3.1 The first cost estimate produced was part of the cost comparison of Holyrood with other sites. It was based on a notional design produced in December 1997. The basic construction cost was estimated at approximately £50 million for a gross building area of 20,070m2. The balance area (for circulation, plant rooms etc) used in the brief calculation was 20% of net area; this has proved to be an underestimate.

4.3.2 Once the design team was appointed yardstick costs were produced by the Quantity Surveyor based on average rates for the different types of accommodation and in October 1998 a new cost estimate of £58.9 million was produced.

4.3.3 The winning concept design was developed in more detail over the next 6 months, culminating in the Stage D cost estimate of 25 May 1999 of £89.2 million for a gross floor area of 27,081 m2 (including approximately 40% balance area).

4.3.4 An amended budget of £62 million was approved in June 1999 based on this estimate. This excluded the design risk assessment (i.e. design uncertainty) and other costs totalling £27.04 million which had been included in the £89.2 million estimate but which were not identified in cost terms in the report to the Client.

4.3.5 Area and cost estimates produced in August and September 1999 showed a substantial increase in gross floor area to 31,121 m2 and a rise in the basic construction cost to £115 million.

4.3.6 The value engineering exercise was conducted with the target of achieving 25% savings. Potential reductions of £20 million in the basic construction cost were identified of which £13.3 million were accepted by the Client.

4.3.7 The area and cost estimates produced by the Quantity Surveyor in February 2000 showed a further rise to a basic construction cost of £138.49 million for 31,310 m2 gross floor area. These estimates were based on the Feasibility Study prepared by the Design Team to show how 203 additional staff could be accommodated. The reliability of the cost estimate is uncertain, in my opinion, due to the short time within which it was made and the limited information on which it was based. Although the total gross area was only up by 200 m2 from the September 1999 figure, the (expensive) building area was actually increased by 2,250 m2 partially balanced by
a reduction of (cheaper) car park area by 2,061 m2.

4.3.8 The effect of the changes to the Brief is that, in my opinion, the Project design is less settled than it was in March 1999 and that the estimate for the basic construction cost is less reliable than it was in May 1999.

4.4 Fit-out and Other costs

4.4.1 In the latest report of February 2000 from the Quantity Surveyor the costs excluded from the basic construction cost were as follows:

1. Site acquisition and associated costs
2. Building control and planning fees
3. Off site costs in respect of party wall disputes
4. Future legislative changes
5. Site and building investigation costs
6. Historic Scotland and archaeology contractor costs
7. Effect of discovery/excavation etc
8. Demolition costs
9. Hard and soft landscaping
10. Built furniture in MSP offices and Assembly and all internal furniture and fittings, planting and equipment
11.Video Conference fit-out
12. Media room fit-out
13. IT hardware/equipment, data, video wall, video conferencing, telephones, electronic voting etc
14. Official Building Models and wind tunnel testing
15. Inflation beyond March 1998
16. Professional consultants and Construction Management fees and charges VAT


4.4.2 Project costs were reported to the Client in June 1999 showing an original figure of £90 million and a revised figure of £109
million, as follows:

4.4.3 As part of this Review the Project Team has, at my request, updated the fit-out costs, which include an allowance for contingencies, as follows:

4.4.4 This revised total is incorporated into the estimate of total budget requirements in section 4.5 below.

4.4.5 The base date used by the Quantity Surveyor for estimating basic construction costs is March 1998. Cost estimates have to be adjusted for the effects of inflation from then to the tender dates for the various work packages so that the estimates may more closely reflect what may happen to tender prices. Such adjustments have not so far been applied to the cost estimates for this project. This Report does so.

4.4.6 Any prediction for future inflation is naturally uncertain. In the assessment of future costs contained in this Review, the Building Cost Information Service indices
produced under the auspices of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors have been used. This produces a figure of 5% building inflation from March 1998 to October 2001 which has been applied to the construction cost in the estimate of total budget requirements below.

4.4.7 The site staff and accommodation costs of the Construction Manager for any period beyond January 2002 have not so far been included in any cost report. This Report does so.

4.5 Total Current Budget Requirements

4.5.1 I believe that the total Project Budget requirement for the scheme presented to the Client in February 2000 was as follows:

I understand that VAT on Professional fees may be recoverable. If this is the case, the total would be reduced by approximately £3.94 million to a total of £226.92 million.

4.6 Costs allocated to other budgets

4.6.1 Some costs associated with the Project are, and always have been, covered by separate budgets. These include, for example, landscaping works between the Holyrood site and the Queen’s Park and the costs of the Project Team staff and their site accommodation. Such costs are accordingly not included in any of the cost comparisons in this Review. I understand that they have been reported to the Corporate Body by the Project T

5 Review of the current estimate of time to delivery and occupation

5.1 The most recent estimate of time to delivery and occupation prepared by the Construction Manager (reference Bovis Programme dated 11 February 2000) was as follows:

5.2 Taking into account the current state of the design and the current instructions to the Design Team, I consider it unlikely that these dates will be achieved.

5.3 On the assumptions (provided by me to the Construction Manager), that a new Scheme Design, including a cost plan, will be approved by the Client by 8 June 2000 and that Bovis are appointed to manage the fit-out as well as the basic construction, more realistic estimates of time to delivery and occupation are as follows:

5.4 It is clearly imperative that the Brief is frozen now and that the Design Team proceeds immediately to produce a Scheme Design including a cost plan to a Brief and a budget approved by the Client, so that approval may be given to proceed with the Project by 8 June 2000, or earlier if that is possible. Removal of the current uncertainties and a reduction in the overall Project cost could result in an earlier date for delivery and occupation. These are matters for consideration by the Client and the Project Team.


5.5 The MSP Block is programmed for completion in June-July 2002 and Queensberry House in March-April 2003. I recommend that the Client should consider taking
occupation of these two buildings in advance of the final project completion date, for three reasons. They would otherwise lie unoccupied which is bad for buildings; current MSPs would be able to occupy their office accommodation before the next election; and the overall capital cost of the project would be reduced by relieving the project of the Construction Manager’s costs for maintaining the buildings unused for up to 18 months. The resulting saving would accrue to the Client. Early occupation would require the current location of the main plant to be reconsidered, but I am advised that this would not be an insurmountable problem.

6 Review of the value for money of the project

6.1 In this section, I set out some comparative costs for guidance and follow this by a discussion on value for money.



6.2 Cost comparisons

6.2.1 The current estimate of the cost of the three principal elements of the project, on a rate per m2 basis, is

6.2.2 The MSP Block provides accommodation for MSPs and their support staff. It may reasonably be compared with, on the one hand, high quality Headquarters Buildings in Edinburgh and, on the other, Portcullis House (the new accommodation for MPs at Westminster), as follows:

It will be noted that the MSP Block is estimated by the Quantity Surveyor at a rate which is twice as expensive as an equivalent Headquarters Building in Edinburgh, but about 75% of the cost of Portcullis House.

6.2.3 Queensberry House provides office accommodation for the Presiding Officer and reception facilities for MSPs. I have been unable to find an equivalent project for comparison. It will however be noted that it is the most expensive part of the project, albeit the smallest, and that it is nearly as expensive as Portcullis House.

6.2.4 The Assembly/Debating Chamber provides meeting rooms for the committees of the Parliament, the Debating Chamber and support accommodation. I have not found an exactly equivalent building in the UK and have accordingly chosen to compare it with the newly completed Museum of Scotland, simply because this is also a complex city centre building with demanding structural and servicing requirements.

6.2.5 The fit-out costs of the Project have been calculated as a percentage of the basic construction cost to allow the following comparison:

Information on Portcullis House is not included because the published information is limited, and the Museum clearly has fit-out requirements of a different order. The
comparison with the Headquarters Building favours the Parliament and suggests that the fit-out standard is appropriate.


6.3 Comparison of basic construction costs

6.3.1 It may be helpful to show how these figures are built up.

TABLE 1

6.3.2 In my opinion, the rates for the frame, upper floors and roof finishes, the external walls and for the services would be worth reviewing and the design and/or specification reconsidered if cost reductions are to be pursued.

TABLE 2

6.3.3 In my opinion, the rate for the frame, upper floors and roof finishes would be worth reviewing and the design and/or specification reconsidered if cost reductions are to be pursued. The rate for the external walls may be explained by the complex building shape and the rate for services by the sophistication of the communications systems and security. They may be less open to review.

TABLE 3

6.3.4 The repairs and restoration element is clearly a considerable burden on this part of the project. In my opinion, the rate for the services is unusually high and would be worth reviewing and the design and specification reconsidered.

6.4 Overall value for money

6.4.1 Value for money is in the eye of the beholder; in this case, the Nation as expressed through the collective voice of Parliament in debate.

6.4.2 If the current estimate of the Project cost, at £230.86 million or thereby (see section 4.5.1 above), is accepted as accurate and affordable, then no more need be said by me.

6.4.3 However, if Parliament were to decide that this is too great a price to pay, but that the Project should proceed, then it may wish to authorise a lesser sum on the Project.

6.4.4 I would counsel against setting cost limits on individual buildings. The current design proposals for many parts of the Project have, I consider, potential for reductions, and to set precise limits would place unhelpful restrictions on the Project Team and disadvantage the Project. I recommend that Parliament should go no further than setting a limit for the Project as a whole and some guidance is given in section 8 below.

6.5 Building area and overall quality

6.5.1 Turning now to the building, as opposed to the Project as a whole, I observe that cost is the product of building area and building quality. And that value for money is the perception of what one is getting for one’s money in absolute and relative terms. It is possible to reduce the cost of a building by making it smaller and/or by reducing the quality of materials and the quality and extent of the built-in services and fit-out required for creature comfort and support to the occupants.

6.5.2 Whatever quality is now thought to be appropriate in the light of the reported costs, the Design Team has been working to meet the requirement that "the building which the Scottish Parliament occupies must be of such a quality, durability and civic importance as to reflect the Parliament’s status and operational requirements" and that must clearly be kept in mind if costs are to be reduced.

6.5.3 The area of the building is a consequence of the number of people working in the building and of the functions which they have to perform. This is of course a matter for the Client.

6.5.4 On the assumption that staff displaced by reducing the size of the buildings have to be housed elsewhere, the Client may wish to consider, before taking a decision on size reduction, where they would be housed and at what capital cost, if any.

6.5.5 Furthermore, it is the experience of all organisations, old and new, that moving into a new building usually reveals that more space is needed than had been
anticipated. It would, in my opinion, be imprudent to reduce the area below the maximum that the site can contain, if this can be afforded.


6.6 Changing the site

6.6.1 I have considered whether or not a change of site for the Project would be productive of savings in the present design. I have not considered the merits of other sites.
This was not in my terms of reference. However the present state of the Project has nothing, in my opinion, to do with the location of the site.

6.6.2 Changing the site would mean starting again. A new brief would be required as the precursor to a new design. The present design could not, in my opinion, be
transplanted unchanged. Time would be lost and this would cost money. The money invested in the Project to date would be largely thrown away.

6.6.3 For these reasons and on the basis of the information currently available to me, I consider that there would be no advantage in moving this design to another site.


6.7 Queensberry House

6.7.1 In my opinion, the expenditure on Queensberry House, at an estimated £10 - £11 million, is not value for money when compared with the benefit gained. On the
information available to me, the building is in poor structural and physical condition. In my opinion, the interior contains little of architectural (as opposed to archaelogical)
value and the interior spaces are neither grand nor memorable. The current design requires removing most of the fabric of the building, and creating a conjectural 17th century
external appearance built around extensively repaired external walls. The construction will be largely 21st century.

6.7.2 This is, in my opinion, an inappropriate approach to providing Parliamentary accommodation, which can in any case only be achieved at great expense in this building. It would, in my opinion, be more appropriate and cost effective to provide the accommodation within a building clearly of the 21st century.

6.7.3 Nevertheless, the current approach may be considered essential and I appreciate that the design and design approval processes may have reached a stage of finality which to undo might cause real harm to the programme. If this is the case, the same effect could be achieved at lesser cost by building anew from new foundations and I recommend that this be done.


6.8 The MSP Block

6.8.1 In my opinion, the cost of the facades of the MSP block could be reduced by simplifying the design. This would also make the facades easier to build and reduce the frequency of maintenance, without compromising the integrity of the architectural design. I recommend that this be done.


6.9 Other issues

6.9.1 It has not been possible to review the value for money of other elements of the Project within the time available. It will be clear from the tabular comparisons contained in sections 6.2 – 6.3 above that there are significant variances from the costs of elements of other comparable buildings and I recommend that these should be borne in mind by the Client and the Design Team.

6.9.2 The terms of the agreements between the various members of the Design Team and the Client and between the Construction Manager and the Client are commercially confidential. I have studied them, but as they are conventional, I do not think it necessary to subject them to analysis in this review.

6.9.3 I do however observe that they were entered into on the basis of a £50 million project. No doubt, had it been appreciated at the time of entering into these contracts that the building costs might increase to the levels now estimated, other terms might have been agreed and the Parties may wish to consider this matter.


7 Review and comparison of the advantages of alternative contractual methods

7.1 This section is about alternative contractual arrangements for the building works. It is not about alternative methods of funding the capital required for the Holyrood Project, which I have not been asked to consider and which are, in my opinion, irrelevant to the present situation.

7.2 The current contractual arrangement, which was selected before the Design Team was appointed but confirmed as appropriate by the Design Team, is as follows:

• The building works are divided into a series of individual "works packages", each for a recognisable element, such as "foundations", "frame", "electrical services", etc.
  
  
• Each is put out to the market at the appropriate moment, for suitable contractors to tender competitively. The most economical is accepted and the work in that package proceeds. A number of work packages will be in progress on site at any one time. Clearly the work of individual work package contractors has to be coordinated. A Construction Manager (Bovis) is employed by the Client to do this.
  
  
• Each work package contractor is contracted to the Client to carry out and complete his package in accordance with the relevant drawings and specification.

• The construction manager is engaged before any building work starts and while design work is still in progress. The Design Team can accordingly use his expertise in building techniques to inform their detailed construction decisions, and his expertise in programming construction operations to inform the selection of appropriate work packages and the timing of design decisions.
  
  
• Because each work package is tendered separately in a logical progression, any variance from the budget for a particular work package can be compensated by increasing or reducing the content of subsequent packages. This can provide a welcome degree of flexibility to the Client and Design Team, albeit that this will diminish with each successive work package.
  
  
• Furthermore, as each work package is tendered separately, advantage of market conditions for each can be obtained at the time it is tendered.

7.7 The advantages and disadvantages, by comparison, of the "single stage lump sum contract" are a mirror image.

• In place of a speedier start on site, leading to an earlier completion, the client obtains a greater degree of cost certainty.
  
  
• In place of separate contracts with each trade package contractor, the client obtains a single point of responsibility with the main contractor.
  
  
• In place of the market price for each trade package, the client has to pay the main contractor’s price which is the aggregate of the cost of his own work and whatever price he places on the work of his sub-contractors. The client does not know what the subcontractor is being paid. In a fierce market place, potential subcontractors may be subjected to a dutch auction, forcing down their prices to the advantage of the main contractor. The client will not benefit from the dutch auction but may suffer from a reduced quality of management and workmanship by the subcontractor.

Achieving one or other of these targets would produce a basic building cost of £110.8 - £117.8 million and an overall Project cost of £188.46 - £199.42 million.

If VAT can be recovered on professional fees as previously mentioned, a further £3.5 million in round terms could be saved from these figures.


9 Review of the effectiveness of communications between the Corporate Body and the Project Team and recommendations

9.1 Conventional management structures and management processes for a government funded project are in place. The Design Team has adopted the industry standard "Plan of Work" for its design work.


9.2 Management Targets

9.2.1 Nevertheless the Project has acquired three characteristics which these management systems are designed to prevent, as follows:

• The approved budget bears no relation to the current Brief.
  
  
• The current Scheme Design bears no relation to the approved budget.
  
  

The Project cannot be completed by the completion date most recently reported to the Client.


9.2.2 Thus the Client’s expectations for time and cost are not being met.


9.3 Communications

9.3.1 There is an established route for communications between the Corporate Body as Client and the Project Team.

9.3.2 Nevertheless the messages which are communicated are not always understood and do not always lead to action being taken, when action is clearly required. That the Client’s expectations for time and cost were not being met has been known within the Project Team for nine months at least.

9.3.3 Messages are not always communicated along the established route and line managers are accordingly, on occasion, less well informed about decisions taken further up the line than those whom they are employed to manage. This is clearly destructive of effective management. In particular, messages between the Client and the Design Team do not always pass through the Project Sponsor and Project Manager. This has led to misunderstandings and to instructions not always being acted on. I have observed examples of both of these during my brief acquaintance with the Project.


9.4 Management recommendations

9.4.1 I do not consider that the characteristics to which I refer above are the consequence of the management structure or the Plan of Work procedures and I do not, accordingly, think that changes to the structure or the procedures are essential. Nevertheless some changes to the manner in which management operates would benefit the Project, as follows:

• Those responsible for communicating a matter on which a decision is required must ensure that the need for the decision is spelt out in the communication.
  
  
• Those responsible for decision making must allocate sufficient time to make and communicate decisions effectively through the correct channel.
  
  
• Where matters are to be discussed and decisions made at a meeting, the relevant line manager(s) should be present. Thus, the Project Sponsor and the Project Manager should be present at any meeting between the Client and the Design Team. The Project Sponsor should be present at any meeting between the Client and the Project Manager.

9.4.2 Although I do not consider it essential that the management structure should be changed, it would nevertheless be prudent for members of the Corporate Body to consider whether it has the time and expertise to perform the Client role on a day-to-day basis. If it does not think that it has, there are two options which could be considered:

• Specialist member
  
  Appoint one member of the Corporate Body as the principal link with the Project Team, spending more time than any member of the Body has yet been able to do and
  becoming in the process better informed and more expert in Project matters.
  
  or
  
  
• Project Progressing Committee
  
  Establish a Project Progressing Committee to support the Corporate Body in the delivery of the Project. I leave consideration of who should serve on this to the
  Corporate Body.

10.4 However, neither the Chief Valuer nor I consider that it would be prudent to assume that this greater area would be permitted by the local planning authority and I recommend that it be discounted.

10.5 If accounting conventions for expenditure by the Parliament meant that grant aid to Queensberry House was effectively a debit against the Project, then Scenario 3 would not be relevant.

10.6 I should emphasise the tentative nature of these valuations. They have had to be made without the normal enquiries and investigations, in a very short space of time.


11 Report on expenditure to date

11.1 The expenditure set against the capital budget to date is shown on the spreadsheet below. The total is £20.907 million.

11.2 The expenditure for March 2000 is expected to be around £3.5 million including VAT. The value of contracts let to and through Bovis is £17,778,286 including VAT. This includes the value of contracts let to or through Bovis for which payments have been made as shown on the spreadsheet.

11.3 The contracts let do not represent committed expenditure. If the Project were to be cancelled, the various construction and professional contracts would, in general terms, entitle the contractors to reimbursement of their earnings to the date of cancellation plus the reasonable costs of closing down their various operations.

11.4 I cannot say what the costs of termination would be with any degree of precision. Much would depend on when this was done and, in my view, the manner in which it was done. However, if the Project were cancelled in early April 2000, a budget for the costs incurred as a result, including expenditure already incurred, would sensibly be in the order of £27-£30 million.

11.5 Relating the site valuations to the predicted cancellation costs shows that there would be a debit in the order of £16 - £30 million.

Annexe 3

IMPACT ON BUDGET OF CHANGES MADE JUNE 99 TO FEBRUARY 2000

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED COSTS AS AT 28 MARCH 2000

Education, Culture and Sport Committee, 3rd Report 2000: Report on Subordinate Legislation (SP Paper 101)

Local Government Committee, 5th Report 2000: Report on Subordinate Legislation (SP Paper 102)

Subordinate Legislation Committee, 14th Report 2000: Report on Subordinate Legislation (SP Paper 103)

Justice and Home Affairs Committee, 2nd Report 2000: Report on Subordinate Legislation (SP Paper 104)